Logos Dojo No. 112
Generational Differences in Perceptions of Nuclear Deterrence in the Russia–Ukraine War
A Preliminary Inquiry from the Perspective of Structuralist Sociology
This essay considers the possibility that the concept of “nuclear deterrence,” which has remained part of international security discourse since the Cold War, may carry different meanings across generations and societies. The discussion is intended to remain as politically neutral as reasonably possible.
Since the end of the Cold War, calls for nuclear disarmament and the abolition of nuclear weapons have been advanced by many countries and civil-society organizations, including those in Japan, the only country to have experienced atomic bombings in war. The recognition that nuclear weapons are capable of causing catastrophic harm to humanity can reasonably be regarded as widely shared across national boundaries.
At the same time, nuclear weapons continue to exist as a material component of contemporary international security. The concept of nuclear deterrence has likewise not disappeared from the security policies of nuclear-armed states.
This raises an important question for the study of contemporary international relations.
When international conflicts are discussed primarily in terms of victory or defeat through conventional warfare, there is a possibility that the risks associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear escalation may receive comparatively insufficient attention.
This does not mean that a strategic defeat involving conventional forces would necessarily lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear doctrines, policies, and decision-making frameworks differ among nuclear-armed states.
Nevertheless, it would also be inappropriate to assume that conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence can always be treated as entirely separate domains.
The Russia–Ukraine war has involved the large-scale use of drones and other relatively new military technologies, contributing to changes in the conduct of warfare.
However, this essay will not examine specific strategies or tactics that might directly affect military operations. Such matters fall outside the scope and purpose of this discussion.
The principal concern here is not military technology itself, but rather how people understand the concept of “nuclear deterrence.”
It is possible that generations that directly experienced the Cold War and generations that grew up after its conclusion may associate different meanings with nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.
This possibility should not be understood as a phenomenon specific to either Russia or Ukraine.
Within Russia, Ukraine, Europe, the United States, Japan, and other societies, perceptions of nuclear weapons may vary according to generation, education, profession, military experience, historical understanding, and other social and individual factors.
At this point, a structuralist perspective may provide a useful analytical framework.
Structuralism allows us to examine a linguistic or semantic system synchronically—that is, as a structure operating at a particular point in time—while also examining diachronically how that system and its meanings have changed over historical time.
This distinction can be provisionally applied to the concept of nuclear deterrence.
Even when the expression “nuclear deterrence”—the signifier (signifiant), or the perceptible form of the sign—remains the same, the signified (signifié), or the conceptual content associated with it, need not necessarily be identical across societies or generations.
For example, for people who directly experienced the Cold War, the expression “nuclear deterrence” may be strongly associated with the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the nuclear arms race, the Cuban Missile Crisis, mutually assured destruction, and the fear of general nuclear war.
For generations that grew up after the end of the Cold War, by contrast, nuclear weapons may still be understood as an immense threat while simultaneously being perceived as weapons that have not been used in warfare for a long period of time.
The purpose of this comparison is not to determine which generation possesses the “correct” perception.
Rather, the analytical question is whether different social groups may construct different signifieds in relation to the same signifier, “nuclear deterrence.”
If such asymmetries of meaning exist between states or among social groups, they could potentially contribute to misunderstanding, misperception, or miscalculation in international politics.
This possibility may also be relevant when considering the future course of the Russia–Ukraine war.
Rather than conceptualizing the conflict exclusively in terms of two outcomes—“a Russian victory” or “a Ukrainian victory”—it is also necessary to consider a third analytical concern: the avoidance of catastrophic escalation in a conflict involving a nuclear-armed state.
From this perspective, I believe that the possibility of a ceasefire or negotiated settlement that does not constitute a complete victory for either side—a form of “bittersweet” peace—should not be excluded from consideration.
This statement should not be interpreted as a proposal for any particular territorial settlement or as an endorsement of specific terms for a peace agreement.
The specific conditions of any ceasefire or peace settlement are matters to be addressed through diplomacy and through the relevant frameworks of international law and international security by the parties directly concerned and other relevant states.
The argument presented here is considerably narrower.
In addition to examining victory and defeat in conventional warfare, we may also need to examine the meanings that different states, societies, and generations attribute to the sign of “nuclear deterrence.”
From the perspective of structuralist sociology:
The sharing of the same signifier does not necessarily imply the sharing of the same signified.
Understanding such differences in meaning may provide one analytical perspective from which to consider how misperception and miscalculation concerning nuclear weapons might be reduced, and how catastrophic outcomes might be avoided.
Because this essay addresses an exceptionally sensitive subject, I will not discuss specific military strategies or tactics. I will therefore conclude at the level of this limited analytical proposition.
I will leave the discussion here for today. (with AI)
This article is in the public domain under CC0.